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Abstract
This paper studies the interplay between top and middle managers as a determinant
of strategy-making effectiveness. Participation is a pivotal concern among different types of
strategy-making process to grasp the conditions that account for effective strategy-making.
We deal with how the resolution of the interplay between managerial levels fosters or hinders
subsequent managerial action, by means of a multiple case design of six Spanish companies.
These six organizations shared managerial participation in different degrees as a valued
property of their strategy process. First round interviews with key informants provided a
profile for each strategic process. Next, we gathered all key informants in an interactive
discussion group, which further evidenced their diversity in the making of strategy. Lastly,
we carried out a final round of interviews to enhance clarification. The targeted organizations
varied in their types of process, core businesses and size. This variety provided a rich and
diverse context to study interaction between upper and lower level managers. By analyzing
how interaction resolved into goals and strategy within the different modes of strategy
process, we dig into the resolution conditions. We present a theoretical framework that
extends existing knowledge on how strategy-making, as a cooperative endeavor between
managerial levels, translates strategy into organizational activities. Findings show that
legitimation of strategic objectives explains the extent to which tasks are carried out and
objectives are accomplished. As an interplay resolution mechanism, legitimation is a property
integrated into goals and means through mutual validation by both top management and
organizational members.
Keywords: Strategy-making process, top and middle managers’ interplay, managerial action. STRATEGY-MAKING VIA PARTICIPATION
The process of developing strategy has been described as an organizational
phenomenon (Hart, 1992). However, it has usually been addressed with a focus either on top
management (Hambrick, 1998) or on middle level managers (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000).
The overarching aim of this paper is to extend existing theory on how the interplay between
top management and organizational members influences strategy-making effectiveness.
This paper describes a field research project using a multiple case study design. The
chosen unit of analysis is the process of strategy-making in six organizations. In similar terms
as in Grant (2003), we focus on the formal planning system used by these organizations, but
we extend the analysis to include previous and subsequent episodes. Participation in the
strategy process is used as a pivotal concept through which we enquire into the role of
organizational members and top management. From observation of their interplay, we aim to
develop theory. Our research question, therefore, is: How is participation shaped
to substantiate the Strategy Process? Specifically, what are the conditions for participation to
breed better strategy-making? 
A range of views on the role of top or lower level managers as key players in
strategy-making appear in the extant literature. “Issue selling” activities shape change from
below by directing the attention of top management (Dutton et al., 2001). Similarly, the
standard process model (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a) has proposed that renewal is
engendered by the identification of strategic issues at lower levels, which are autonomously
brought to the company’s strategy. Additionally, under this model, top management efforts to
direct strategy have been regarded as increasingly tied to exploiting existing markets and
products (Burgelman, 2002). Challenging the standard process theory, the model of guided
evolution has set forth a more active role of top management (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000), in
which top management, besides setting the context, also foster or hinder strategic
development. Moreover, by differentiating between development of existing and new
capabilities in capital investment, Maritan (2001) suggests that the development of new
capabilities is generated at the senior level, while existing capabilities are developed by lower
level managers. These findings not only differ from the standard process model but also
suggest that distinctive processes co-exist.
Considering some aspects of the standard process model as well as aspects of the
more active role of top management, we will address the conditions under which
participation shapes strategy-making in an effective manner. In order to integrate these views,
Financial Support was provided by the Anselmo Rubiralta Center for Globalization and Strategy at IESE
Business School.we build on Hart’s (1992) five modes of strategy-making, namely command, symbolic,
rational, transactive and generative1. These modes take into account different degrees of
participation of organizational members and top management to describe different forms the
strategy process may take. The key feature of Hart’s modes is that more than one of them can
be present along the strategy process of a specific organization.This feature permits the
analysis of the roles played by participation of organizational members and top management
across the strategy process.
In the first section, we will present the theoretical underpinnings that guide this
study. The second section describes the multiple-case research setting and the methodology
used to collect and analyze data. The third section will present the cases studied. The fourth
section will show the main findings of the study. Finally, the last section offers a discussion
and presents the conclusions. 
Theoretical background
Involvement in strategy-making has been shown to affect organizational
performance through improved quality of strategy, rather than through improved
implementation (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). Though, intuitively, involvement and
implementation seem to be related, these authors suggest that involvement by itself does not
produce commitment. Hence, involvement on its own does not cause better implementation.
In this line of thought, our stance is that under certain conditions involvement will foster or
hinder effectiveness of strategy-making. 
A second reason for the non-supported involvement-implementation link rests on
top management’s role, as suggested by Wooldridge and Floyd (1990). Namely, that
involvement affects performance through improved implementation. In these authors’
opinion, although genuine involvement was valuable for top and middle managers, when
middle managers “voiced dissatisfaction with their organization’s strategy, it was not in terms
of objectives, but rather in how these objectives were to be accomplished” (Wooldridge and
Floyd, 1990: 238). Thus, top management’s key task when managing the process is to create
the context for the generation and evaluation of strategic initiatives (Burgelman, 1983c).
Consequently, goals and context act as an objective function, under which participation can
be guided and cooperative. In line with Lovas and Ghoshal (2000), we view the strategy
process as guided by top management by means of setting the strategic intent as an objective
function, encouraged by which middle managers can affect the strategy process via
participation. 
‘Behavioral integration’ has been described as “the degree to which the group
engages in mutual and collective interaction” (Hambrick, 1998: 188), with respect to the top
management group. According to Hambrick (1998), maladaptation and organizational inertia
are caused partially by the lack of behavioral integration, since the executives are isolated
from each other. Although, managers may have all the required “information, insights and
energies to do their own jobs and potentially to mount responses to the environment, they are
unable or disinclined to actually formulate and execute organizational action” (Hambrick,
1998: 188). This concept, developed by Hambrick (1994, 1998) for the top group, can be
extended to the interplay between organizational members and the top group. Although the
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1 A description of each mode appears in Table 2.degree of potential integration may be lessened for a wider group, the same principles may
apply. 
The driver of effective strategy making in the present study is the interaction
between top management and lower levels. This interaction can be resolved through a variety
of mechanisms, as developed in extant literature. A list describing these mechanisms is
shown in Table 1. The list is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to illustrate how
comparable resolution mechanisms have previously been used. Consensus or agreement
(Bourgeois, 1980; Dess, 1987) have been described as resolution mechanisms mainly for the
top management group, but Bourgeois (1985) showed that the process of achieving consensus
could outweigh the benefits of agreement as a resolution mechanism. Agreement can also be
too costly, since it may cause group homogeneity (Hambrick, 1998) and suppress healthy
skepticism about strategy (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). In the case of the interaction
between organizational members and top management participation, the resolution
mechanism must allow for heterogeneity, but also encompass accord in contents as much as
willingness to act. This makes mere communication of strategy too weak as a mechanism.
Thus, for the interaction between top managers and organizational members we will rely on
legitimation as a resolution mechanism. 
Table 1. List of potential resolution mechanisms
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Knowledge of firm’s strategy Confirmed a decline in strategic
awareness at descending levels of the
managerial hierarchy





of the contribution of a
competency to the firm's
competitive advantage
Specific evidence links firm performance







Communication Communication: the provision
of an appropriate network and
necessary data to all key actors
in the project implementation
Communication is one of the planning








They are surprising in that they show
middle management involvement, but
not consensus, to be associated with
organizational performance.




Agreement on goals and means The achieved consensus can benefit
organizational performance, but the
process to achieve it may negatively
affect performance. While consensus
might not be reachable, agreement is
feasible and requires less effort than
consensus.




Agreement among top, middle
and lower-level managers on
the fundamental priorities of
the organization
Unless they understand the strategic
context, however, lower level managers
are unable to recognize significant











Consensus on method/strategies is
positively related to organizational
performance
Top Managers (Dess, 1987)Legitimation of strategic objectives, described as the property through which a
proposed strategy is allowed or accepted by both organizational members and top
management (Canales and Vilà, forthcoming in 2004), provides a promising concept to
portray the interaction resolution mechanism. A legitimated strategy is far less restrictive
than consensus or agreement, since it only requires acceptance from both organizational
members and top management. That does not necessarily mean concurrence in all terms, but
only on the indispensable ones to carry the strategy out. Instead of acting on the top
management group, legitimation acts on the mutually accepted strategy. It is not extended to
everyone in the organization, but is a property of the strategic objectives legitimized by
organizational members as well as top management. Our stance is that if the organizational
strategy is legitimized, then it can be translated into action, participation being the vehicle for
this legitimation. Thus, strategy regarded as legitimate, by both organizational members and
top management, would be a desirable property to achieve integration. The conditions for
legitimacy, as an outcome of participation, are the subject of the present study. 
The degree of participation of organizational members is increasing across the five
modes proposed by Hart (1992). Table 2 describes the main features of each mode. In the
command mode participation is minimal; in the symbolic mode it is subject to the vision; in
the  rational  mode it is confined to the formal process; in the transactive  mode it is
engendered by mutual understanding; and in the generative mode participation of
organizational members almost takes over strategy generation. All five modes can occur
across the strategy process of an organization. But more importantly, the use of more modes
by an organization tends to lead to better performance (Hart and Banbury, 1994). It follows
that the use of more modes, by combining different degrees of participation in each mode,
will tend to improve strategy-making. However, a word of caution on adding strategy-making
modes: as noted by Hart and Banbury (1994), simply adding modes can be dysfunctional, as
the presence of one mode may override another. 
The integrative view of the strategy process, comprising different and yet co-
existing modes across the process, provides a rich lens to analyze the role played by
participation. It allows the analysis to be performed in light of several views of the strategy
process. First, the claim of the standard process model, in which strategy is mainly the result
of autonomous behavior (Burgelman, 1983b), can be identified in all modes except for the
command mode. Second, issue selling (Dutton and Ashford, 1993) is permitted in all modes.
Third, normative models, such as the ones offered in Hofer and Schendel (1978) or Ansoff
(1987), are reflected through the five modes. Finally, models that focus on organizational
actors, such as Floyd and Wooldridge (1992) or Hambrick (1994), are equivalent to roles
described in Table 2.
4Table 2. An Integrative Framework for Strategy-Making Process
Source: Hart (1992: 334).
Methods
A Multiple Case Design
We chose six organizations following a multiple case design for this study, using a
replication logic, as recommended in Yin (1994). The main selection criterion used was that
participation of organizational members was either a valued feature or an element in use
along the organizations’ strategy-making processes. Other selection criteria were: a superior
self-perceived performance over the last few years; and self-awareness that a strategy process
carried out had been improved. The chosen organizations belonged to different industries,
conducted their strategy processes in distinctive fashions, had different architectural designs
in their structure, competed in either munificent or rather tight markets, and were locally or
internationally owned. We deliberately allowed variation in all these aspects across the
chosen cases. However, in the case of internationally owned firms, a significant degree of
autonomy from their respective headquarters was verified for all three. This variety provided
flexibility without changing the purpose of the study (Seidman, 1998; Yin, 1994). 
A preliminary list containing 35 firms was prepared. Most of these candidates were
eliminated after talking to industry experts and key informants. The criteria used to discard
them were their use of participation in strategy-making and their willingness to participate.
Then, initial contacts were made with 14 organizations as candidates for this study. From
these, the six cases presented in Table 3 were carefully chosen as the best available cases to
study participation in strategy-making. Theoretical replication was favored in choosing these
cases, i.e. our aim was to search for contrasting results within predictable reasons (Yin,
1994). The six organizations agreed to participate in this study, but their names have been
concealed.
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Descriptive Command Symbolic Rational Transactive Generative
Style (Imperial) (Cultural) (Analytical) (Procedural) (Organic)
Strategy driven
by TM, by leader
or small team
Strategy driven
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Soldier Player Subordinate Participant Entrepreneur
Obey orders Respond to
challenges
Follow system Learn and
Improve
Experiment and
Take RiskTable 3. Main characteristics of the six chosen cases 
Data Collection
A first round of interviews was held with either one or two key informants from
each of the chosen companies (Seidman, 1998). An interview protocol ensured that the same
themes were covered in each interview, aiming at reliability (Yin, 1994). A list of themes
contained in the protocol used for the interviews is presented in Exhibit 1. All first-round
interviews were recorded and transcribed. Interviews lasted between 90 and 120 minutes,
with a median of 100 minutes. The questions were handed out to the interviewees
beforehand, in the form of a thematic summary of the questions, in order to take full
advantage of interview time. An indicative list of all interviews appears in Exhibit 2. All data
obtained were classified in a database for trouble-free retrieval (Yin, 1994). Although the
interviews took place in 2003, the questions asked for information on the development of the
companies’ strategy process over the last several years. Our approach was thus aimed at
understanding how their process had improved over time. Construct validity of the interview
data was pursued by regarding the interviewees’ causal explanations as testable (Argyris et
al., 1985). It must be noted, however, that in each organization we had access to at most two
key informants in the first round of interviews. Nevertheless, by checking interview data
against archival data regarding the strategy processes we were able to assess the
interviewee’s explanations (Yin, 1994). In addition, the two researchers explicitly looked for
alternative explanations and directed their attention to internal processes. 
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Name (concealed) INSSUBANC ENGCONSULT MOBILITY REFOIL TECHNO PROSTEEL
- Ownership Alliance Local Local Subsidiary Subsidiary Local




Oil Refinery Technology Steel
manufacturing
- Multi-business No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
- Number of years with a formal
strategy process
52 8 1 5 3 1 3 3 5










- Total number of employees 700 1,300 1,500 340 2,134 3,800
- Number of persons who
participated in the last strategic
exercise
50 80 100 30 80 120
- Proportion (measure of
participation)
7.14% 6.15% 10.00% 8.82% 3.75% 3.16%
- Number of middle and lower
level managers
43 120 80 25 200 440
- Number of top level managers 7 10 7 6 32 60
- Number of middle and lower
level managers who participated
43 70 80 20 48 60
- Proportion of middle
managers who participated
100% 58.3% 100% 80% NA 13.63%















growthNext, the two reviewers prepared a profile for each of the organizations under study,
as suggested in Miles and Huberman (1994) and Silverman (2001). The data used to develop
the profiles were obtained from the interviews with key informants, as well as from internal
company documents provided by the organizations. Each profile was compared with the
interview transcript and archival material. Subsequently, each and every key informant was
sent his/her organization’s profile. All key informants were asked to validate the profile, and
to correct it where needed. Validation of the profiles was done by at least two other
executives apart from the key informant in each organization. When received back by the
researchers, the final profiles had been approved by each organization as a sound description
of its strategy process. 
After the profiles had been completed, each organization was invited to participate
in an ‘Interactive discussion group’, following the recommendation given in Balogun et al.
(2003). Eleven participants from the sample organizations attended the discussion group, as
detailed in Exhibit 3. The goal of this approach was to gather individuals whose opinions,
attitudes, beliefs and memories were rich in relation to the phenomenon of interest, i.e.
developing strategy and using participative practices (Balogun et al., 2003). Thus, each
participant was a key member of his or her organization and at the same time had extensive
experience in strategy-making.
To guide the dialogue group, we used a questionnaire. The component concepts for
the questions in this questionnaire were previously gathered from participants, according to
their key concerns with respect to participation in the strategy process. Next, these concerns
were arranged according to broad subjects by the researchers and handed out to participants
at the beginning of the session. These broad subjects, shown in Exhibit 4, were the basic road
map for the interactive discussion group. In order to encourage the participants to compare
and contrast the features of each other’s process, everyone had received, before the
discussion group, copies of the other organizations’ profiles. Our aim was to explore insights
on participation, yet those insights had to be pertinent mainly for attendees and grounded on
their insights. We aimed at collecting data on how attendees perceived the differences
between their processes, and on the conditions in which participation in strategy-making was
seen as valuable in their specific circumstances. The researchers acted only as moderators,
while the way to address issues was shaped by attendees (Krueger, 1999). In this fashion the
valuable time of the session was used mainly for discussion and clarification. The whole
discussion group session was recorded, and transcribed immediately afterwards. 
A second round of interviews was held with an additional set of key informants. In
all cases these were different than the interviewees in the first round. The goal of this stage
was mainly for clarification and verification purposes, aiming at reliability of the data
obtained from the first-round interviews and the discussion group (Yin, 1994). The same
protocol as in the first round was used to foster construct validity. A list of these interviews
appears in Exhibit 2. 
Analysis and Interpretation
Alongside the guidelines of Miles and Huberman (1994), typical methods for
qualitative data display and analysis were used. We recorded, transcribed and codified
interviews and the interactive discussion group using Hart’s (1992) descriptive modes,
detailed in Table 2. Then, we counted the mentions we had identified, for each mode. We
interpreted the common features and patterns among the strategy processes, described as a
7sequence of modes, for each case studied. Coding was performed for each profile and, then,
in the transcription of the discussion group, using a contrast table (Miles and Huberman,
1994). Next, codes were ordered according to occurrence. The coding procedure was
developed keeping track of the original data, so as not to detach interpretation from observed
facts (Miles and Huberman, 1994). From coding the profiles, a distinctive pattern emerged
for each of the cases studied. Subsequently, we codified the discussion group transcript and
analyzed how this modified the pattern for each organization. The hierarchy resulting from
the analysis of the profile was the same as for the analysis of the discussion group transcript.
These patterns turned out to show a hierarchy and a sequence of modes. We were
thus able to state participation according to these modes. Additionally, it became apparent
how the interplay between organizational members and top management varied across the
cases under study. By comparing the common and distinctive features of these patterns, we
were able to state the conditions under which participation strengthens effectiveness of
strategy-making. Additionally, we were able to further develop the legitimation construct and
see how it suggests successive integration among managerial levels. To strengthen internal
validity (Yin, 1994), interview data were crosschecked with archival data and contrasted with
data from other respondents in the second round of interviews. Each process sequence was
drawn for each sample organization, and participation characteristics were obtained. 
Research Setting
General Elements
Unlike Hart’s (1992) conception of organizational members, we encountered
participation in the sample organizations from levels 2, 3 and 4, below the CEO. These
hierarchical levels match the description of middle managers, according to Dutton et al.,
(1997) and Floyd and Wooldridge (1992). This was the layer within the organizations that
developed projects or objectives to be brought into strategy. Participation of middle managers
took place either at an initial reflection stage or during the stage of designing means to
achieve desired ends. In the words of one of the informants, “commitment is nurtured
through participation in deciding the ‘how’ as much as in suggesting ideas”. 
Another commonality of the cases was the role of top management. This role can be
perfectly described as setting the strategic intent in the form of an objective function as
modeled by Lovas and Ghoshal (2000). The objective function, defined as those long-term
goals that reflect the preferred future position of the firm, as articulated by its top
management, optimizes the firm’s long-term performance by providing a focused purpose for
middle managers. Akin to Canales and Vilà (forthcoming in 2004), clearly stated and
grounded in the organization, the objective function formed a canvas over which managers
developed strategy.
The interactive role of top with middle management portrays strategy-making as a
collaborative endeavor. This representation differs from the standard process model (Bower,
1970; Burgelman, 1983a) since it places renewal efforts at the core of this interaction, and not
as a fundamentally autonomous process in which lower level managers have to convince top
managers of their initiatives. It also differs from traditional normative models such as Hofer
and Schendel’s (1978), since it is interaction between managers that brings forth strategy and
not communication from higher to lower levels. The structure of the processes studied,
together with the features of participation, resemble what Grant (2003) has called emergence
8planning, in the sense that a planning or deliberate force cooperates with an emergent one,
which is the contribution of middle manager participation. 
We  have summarized the interaction between top and middle managers in the
schematic form shown in Figure 1. This scheme is based on the one developed in Canales
and Vilà (forthcoming in 2004). For each sample company, we have illustrated the interaction
between top and middle management, highlighting the stage where, according to the
informants, the outcome, as a legitimized strategy, surfaces. It must be noted that this
outcome, i.e. strategy converted into either specific projects or implementation plans, is the
resulting phase of this interaction. These illustrations have been drawn from the individual
profiles of the organizations studied. In the following section we will present a brief
description of the strategy processes observed in the organizations studied. 
Description of the Organizations
Inssubanc: Inssubanc is a life insurance company formed through a joint venture
between a foreign and a local partner. In 13 years of existence it has become a major player
in the Spanish market. They have structured their strategy process as a result of top
management’s concern that the lower levels of the organization did not share the company’s
strategy. Top management gets together every year to devise and revise medium and long-
term objectives of the company. Then, top management invites each member of the middle
management to propose his/her unit’s goals and projects to top management under the
umbrella of a broad corporate strategy, synthesized in twenty corporate goals. This formal
interaction between top and middle level management forced middle managers to look cross-
functionally instead of only at their unit. The results of this practice have been that the
owners of goals and projects are middle managers, and they drive subsequent action. Top
management uses a scorecard to observe progress. 
Engconsult: Born as an engineering firm formed by freelance professionals,
Engconsult has remained true to the spirit of ‘free-association’. They reject hierarchical
levels and push the organization to remain a network of professionals instead of a
multilayered hierarchy. This design is thought to serve their multi-need customers, which
may want to be served in a variety of services, such as architecture, engineering, and even
management consulting. Every five to eight years, a broad managerial base sets the type of
company they want to be, from broad goals delineated by top management. They aim at
coming out of this stage with breaking objectives for the future. Meanwhile, middle level
managers in close contact with the customers offer and develop projects. Strategy then
emerges from lower levels, closely coupled with market needs. If customers need a service
not included in the broad goals, consideration will be given to broadening those goals. Hence
managerial action is linked to projects, which result from the joint decision of the devised
future of the company.
Mobility: A long-established institution in Spain, Mobility serves customers in their
mobility-related services, from car assistance to travel. They have been growing intensely in
the last seven years due to a proactive strategy. Their strategy process has developed into
different degrees of formalization and involvement over that same period. The system has a
wide reach, from planning to implementation and tracking. The core of the process is the
planning exercise, performed every three years. This exercise is formalized but flexible. For
four months, multidisciplinary groups carry out everything from environmental scanning to
project definition. Corporate strategy defined by top management, based on market analysis,
is deployed into business level strategy, mostly developed by middle level managers. Middle
9and lower level managers participate in proposing projects, which are discussed in the
executive committee. After projects and goals have been determined, a thorough system
keeps track of their progress.
Refoil: This is an oil-refining subsidiary of a major oil company, whose mission is to
cover the needs of a major part of the Spanish territory. Top management receives non-
negotiable goals in key performance areas from headquarters. Their basic concern is to keep
production fitted with local needs, but the key decisions bear a lag that requires at least a one-
year decision span. This stage generates a preliminary document. In the second stage, this
preliminary document is discussed in a broader assembly, and personal implication is sought
via participation in working groups. This stage finishes with a performance contract
including unit and individual commitments to the headquarters’ objectives.These objectives
deal with operational, security, environmental, financial and people themes. Periodically,
progress in objectives is communicated at individual and organizational levels.
Techno: This is a subsidiary company of a major information technology
multinational. Although a significant part of its activity is to adapt global solutions to the
local market, it also conducts R&D in a specific segment. Organized into four main business
groups, it has evolved from a highly structured planning process into a more results-oriented
system. Due to a highly competitive market, this company has moved from a system of
highly formalized planning to a more substantive annual exercise. In this subsidiary, strategic
reflection is carried out by the business group top management team, which then incorporates
the guidelines from headquarters, adapting them to local needs. This turns out to be the
general frame within which each department, and finally each person, states his or her
objectives on a participative basis. The strategy to go to market is devised on the basis of
local needs and headquarters’ requirements of each business. Once the go to market has been
locally defined, the requirements in products and distribution channels are allocated.
Prosteel: This company produces steel from scratch. The basic decisions deal with
how much to produce and the cost of raw material. Their strategy process is hierarchical. Top
management would challenge middle managers with new purchases to increase volume or
innovation strategies, while middle managers have to keep pace in putting these decisions
into practice. The main building block of their process is the annual meeting, in which top
management presents the general long-range guidelines and business managers present their
strategies. The strategic guidelines that stem from this meeting are turned into budgets and
medium range objectives.
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Proclamation of objetive function
Definition of Strategy
                              Implementation
Received Objetive Function from HQ
Adaptation to local needs
Agreement
Cascade of Goals to individual level
Generation of local objetives
Communication
              Participation on how to implement
                  goals
Received Objetive Function from HQResearch Finding
Participation did not always breed better strategy-making. Depending on the
outcome sought, participation was deemed beneficial or detrimental to the strategy process.
Along the formal exercise, all the organizations in our sample fostered participation, which
resulted in top and middle manager interplay. Participation sought to embed objectives and
projects in middle and top managers, as they accepted them as legitimate. Nevertheless,
participation in subsequent or previous episodes was seen as a less valuable effort. As one of
the participants of the discussion group put it: 
“If we invest several months and effort in order to come up with projects that
are accepted, from then on it is time to proceed along the agreed guidelines… Unless
we require a new planning retreat, the established guidelines should prevail. We
cannot invite participation every time a decision has to be made.” 
Participation was seen as a beneficial part of the formal process since it dressed up
the objective function. The objective function stood as an ill-defined problem that was
refined and shaped as the top and middle manager interplay progressed towards legitimation.
If managers considered goals and initiatives as legitimate, then participation had helped to
build a common platform. One key concern in establishing such a platform was a satisfactory
reward system, as a necessary condition.
The outcome sought from the interplay was a sound and, at the same time, mutually
accepted strategy. “Participation can generate commitment, knowledge and information
sharing, and so on… but unless we hit the market with the appropriate strategy, we are
doomed.” Hence, the data analyzed suggest a twofold outcome to the value of participation.
First, that it fosters the generation of better quality strategy. Second, that the strategy
development process itself is perceived as valuable. 
In the following section we will illustrate and develop further the findings of the
cases studied. We will do this using the lens of Hart’s modes for strategy-making. 
Hart’s Modes in the Organizations Under Study
In order to obtain a thorough account of how strategy-making differed among the six
organizations in our sample, we used Hart’s (1992) typology. The strategy-making modes
identified in these organizations confirm Hart’s claim that different modes can co-exist.
Furthermore, our study shows how each mode is used for different purposes along the
strategy-making process. By coding mentions according to Hart’s typology, we developed



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oAll modes were observed in all the organizations to different degrees, except for
Prosteel, where just three modes were present. This is perfectly compatible with Hart’s
hypothesis. All five modes can be present along the strategy process of a single organization
to different degrees. Yet, additionally, by combining the fine-grain data obtained from the
case studies, we aim at describing how the distinct modes combine to build capabilities of
strategy-making. Moreover, we aim at portraying how the different modes combine through
middle managers’ participation. 
Mobility was the organization that showed a more balanced use of the five modes,
except for the command mode. It used the command mode fundamentally for setting the
objective function at the beginning of the strategic exercise. The most prevalent mode was
the rational one, since the system used to form strategy was the skeleton from which the other
modes were brought up. However, all through the company’s strategy process, the four
other modes were present, as participation was also persistent. The symbolic mode was used
to convey the objective function, while the generative mode was used to engender new
projects by middle managers. The transactive mode was used as a means for mutual
acceptance of strategic goals and projects. 
Prosteel was the organization that had fewest modes. Additionally, the command
mode turned out to be the most important, not only to convey the objective function but also
to put in place most aspects of strategy. Opposite to Prosteel was Engconsult, for which the
generative mode was predominant. One reason for this difference is the type of business in
which each operated. While Prosteel was oriented to transform steel, which is a rather
unvarying activity, Engconsult was devoted to delivering tailor-made services to a variety of
customers. 
Techno, like Mobility, relied on their system to develop strategy, but the rational
mode seemed to be more present in Techno than in Mobility. Techno’s reported long tradition
in strategic planning suggests that their strategy-making capability was sustained within the
system they had developed. In changing environments such as the one Techno was facing, the
skill to cascade objectives down through the organization suggests a strategy-making
capability. 
The case of Refoil shows a marked presence of the transactive mode. For Refoil, the
key decision has to do with how to put into practice the guidelines from headquarters; hence,
mutual acceptance was kept as the mechanism that translated goals into concrete activities.
However, in all six organizations the transactive mode emerged as either the first or second
most frequently used mode. The transactive mode is based on mutual adjustments and is the
mode in which the functionality of participation seems clearest. However, the transactive
mode and the effectiveness of participation seemed to depend on the existence of the other
four. 
Conditions for Participation to be Effective
Participation ‘per se’, or at every stage of strategy-making, was up front considered
inadequate. Non-effective participation in strategy-making was generally reflected in two
ways: first, informants’ sense of wasting their time; and second, the need for participation to
produce a ‘good’ strategy. Related to the first, interviewees expressed a general perception of
strategy-making as taking away time from line responsibilities. This perception demanded
that time used in developing strategy be seen as worthwhile. To illustrate, one informant
indicated, “that he would prefer to be told what to do, rather than filling out forms that would
15never have any effect”. In fact, participation was deemed as requiring feedback ex-post on
the decisions that had been made. Otherwise, no sense of ownership was developed. In a
similar vein, informants agreed that the call for participation was embedded in the design of
the strategy process and that it had to be used with precision regarding how and when.
Related to the second aspect, the opinions of the informants coincided in that,
regardless of participative practices, if the resulting strategy was not appropriate, the fact that
participation had taken place did not lead to better results. One informant said, “The
participative development of strategy must head towards improving the way we do things”.
These concepts were discussed in depth during the interactive discussion, where a significant
degree of agreement was reached regarding these two components of effective strategy-
making.
The two emergent components somewhat resemble the concepts of process
performance and product effectiveness (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). These authors
developed this dependent variable for a model of product development. We will use it to root
the construct of strategy-making effectiveness. Process performance refers to the speed and
productivity of the process: “Process performance is driven by the amount, variety, and
problem-solving organization of information and by the resources available to the team
(1995: 366)”. Product effectiveness refers to the integrity of the outcome, in this case,
strategy: “Product effectiveness is driven by the input of leaders, senior management, and
customers into the formation of a clear product vision (1995: 366)”. Borrowing from these
definitions, we characterize participation effectiveness as composed of two elements, namely,
the effectiveness of the process and the effectiveness of the final outcome, the former being
the perception of a good use of time and effort, and the latter the perception of obtaining
superior strategy.
The case studies suggest that the command mode coupled with the symbolic mode
provided the minimum necessary ground for participation to be effective. The command
mode, which appeared in different degrees in all the organizations studied, was used to
deliver up-front the strategic intent as the objective function, which broadened the level of
ambition of participants. If clearly stated and grounded in the organization, the objective
function gave a target to aim at, and was helpful in avoiding searches for projects outside it.
The symbolic mode was used in a similar manner, but reinforced the effect of the command
mode by challenging the organization to aim higher. While the command mode was used
mainly in initial stages, the symbolic mode prevailed as the organization moved closer to
carrying out strategic activities.
The generative mode was driven mainly by middle managers. With support from top
management, the initiatives generated by middle managers produced plans and projects,
which could be carried out within the scope of the objective function. Being the mode in
which participation is most important, the transactive mode is also effective to the extent that
it reinforces the generative mode. The generative mode provided the initiatives that could be
either accepted or not by the interplay that took place, mainly in transactive mode, between
top and middle managers. Finally, the rational mode appeared as the common thread that kept
the other four modes together by fostering or hindering the managerial interplay. The rational
mode, supportive to the other four, gave participants a sense of sound progress, since it
provided a road map.
The data obtained from the six sample organizations suggest that participation can
be key to linking thinking and acting through strategy making. One fine example was the one
given by one of the informants in Inssubanc. This informant told the story of the medieval
16workers building a cathedral. During the construction of a cathedral, when asked what their
work was, the quarry workers would answer that they made building blocks. In contrast, the
workers who built the scaffold would answer that they were building cathedrals, even if their
work vanished when the building was over. Following from this, the informant commented
that by promoting participation and ownership over strategy, Inssubanc sought to encourage
their middle managers to answer as the scaffold workers: the strategy process helped them
see the end result of their work as integrated with that of others.Thus, mere participation was
not enough; it had to change the way people pursued objectives.
The integration of the five modes is what gives meaning to participation.
Participation is different in each mode. How participation is organized depends on how the
balance among the five modes is settled. According to this study, participation only
substantiates strategy-making if participation takes place within the structure of the five
modes of strategy-making. The use of one mode on its own would probably lead to lack of
progress in strategy-making. 
The data from the six case studies suggests that the conditions under which
participation may effectively shape the strategy process are: (1) that participation be framed
by a clearly stated and ambitious strategic intent; (2) that business goals and subsequent
lower levels goals, as well as projects, be generated with deep involvement of middle level
managers; (3) that an interplay develop among top and middle managers; and (4) that this
interplay be translated into acceptance by both managerial levels with respect to overlapping
responsibilities. The mechanism to achieve this level of acceptance between managerial
levels, as suggested by these case studies, seems to be legitimation. 
Legitimation
For participation to be effective, a mechanism that settles the interplay between
managerial levels must be present. Data from the six cases studied support the concept of
legitimation. One key concern of all informants was that promoting participation generated
an obligation on top management to explain why some middle managers’ proposals had not
been accepted. The answer provided by informants for this pitfall of participation was to
establish an instance by which all proposals were discussed. Then, acceptance or refusal
decisions would have a justification attached, especially in cases where they were rejected.
This notion refers directly to the concept of legitimation. 
Three conditions for legitimation to exist emerged from the case study data. First,
that the interplay between middle and top management was based on discussion and
evaluation of arguments, not on mere opinions or imposition. Second, that in the course of
the interplay, roles were defined up-front and the distinction between the judge and jury was
clearly stated from the outset. If agreement were not reached, a body appointed to resolve the
impasse would act as a judge; most commonly this would be the CEO. Thirdly, that
discussion be based on objective fact rather than on value judgments or mere opinion.
Legitimation can be described as the property through which a proposed strategic issue, be it
a strategic goal or a project, was made official and subsequently was encouraged to be carried
out by both top and middle level managers. A strategic issue was used as a subject of
acceptance, with potential true impact on subsequent action. These conditions resemble the
conditions obtained in Canales and Vilà (forthcoming 2004). 
Additionally, the study of the six cases makes clear an additional necessary
condition, i.e. the perception that the reward system is satisfactory. Akin to Boyd and
17Salamin (2001) and Marginson (2002), informants regarded the appropriate design and
application of a reward system as a necessary way to build commitment. However, we will
not go into particulars, as this is a subject that goes beyond the scope of this paper. In general,
the rational mode is assumed to have included a satisfactory reward system
The general impact that participation had on the strategy process was that it
produced a sense of ownership of the accepted strategy, which we have described as
legitimation. Thanks to participation, middle managers recognized the value of the proposed
strategy. Whether or not they themselves had proposed it, middle managers’ responsibilities
were tied to a certain course of action, and they knew why they were carrying it out, as the
strategic goals or projects had legitimacy. This knowledge gave them a feeling that
the strategy-process was worthwhile. In line with the concept developed by Brown and
Eisenhardt (1995), legitimated goals and projects can lead to participation effectiveness. As a
second advantage of a participative process, all informants reported that they had developed
better projects thanks to information exchange between middle and top management. In line
with Wooldridge and Floyd (1990), participation in strategy-making influenced the quality of
strategy. A diagram showing this theoretical development is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2. A Framework for participative strategy-making
Discussion and Conclusions
Discussion
Caution is advised in discussing the results of this study. Even if a multiple case
design is considered more robust (Yin, 1994) than a single case design, this study has some
limitations. First, it has been carried out in a Spanish context, and cultural elements may
explain part of our findings. Second, being a multiple case study, a replication logic has been
used which differs from the sampling logic, making generalization problematic. Finally, we
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Participation Legitimation Rationalhave used qualitative data, which require interpretation. While this approach is highly
powerful for developing theory, it does not provide unequivocal results. Nevertheless,
precautions have been taken to strengthen validity and reliability, and further quantitative
designs in future research will strengthen the framework and concepts presented here.
Moreover, most of the concepts used in this paper have been operationalized in Hart and
Banbury (1994), or Brown and Eisenhardt (1995), thus allowing for wide sample verification
in the future. 
In this paper we offer some fresh concepts that may lead to a better understanding of
how strategy is created and disseminated. This tendency is shared with some authors who, in
line with Chakravarthy and Doz (1992), aim at addressing how firms achieve and maintain
effective decision processes to remain competitive. This has been done, for instance, in the
relationship between organizational learning and renewal (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003), in
the work of strategists (Samra-Fredericks, 2003), or in the relationship between business
planning and the development of new ventures (Delmar and Shane, 2003), and in managing
the emotional states of middle managers in a context of radical change (Huy, 2002). The
process model developed in this paper aims at linking participation practices and strategy-
making, following the line of research opened by Wooldridge and Floyd (1989, 1990). The
lack of relationship between involvement and implementation found by these authors might
be explained by the absence of a mediating element. We aimed at shedding light on this
mediating element by using the concept of legitimation and combining Hart’s modes.
Although not conclusive, this opens avenues for research in the critical task of making
strategy happen. All in all, the formal arrangements we describe enhance individual problem
solving capability and favor individual discretion, so that participants contribute their talents
and energies to a wider task (McGregor, 1960).
In a recent publication, Peteraf (forthcoming 2004) seeks to establish bridges from
the Resource Based View (RBV) to the Bower-Burgelman process model. One of the crucial
elements this author draws on in order to build this bridge is the role of top management in
relation to that of middle management. According to Peteraf, capabilities from either level
will tend to be distinctive and nested within the organization. Hence, the relationship among
these levels and consequently among their capabilities, as treated in this paper, could suggest
a path for how strategy-making capabilities are developed. Moreover, Peteraf puts forward
that there are unanswered questions as to whether a resource-based strategy can emerge
without guidance from the top. The approach used in this paper, combining top-down and
bottom-up elements, may be useful in understanding how guidance is developed under
emerging events. Legitimation of a strategy created in a generative fashion by middle
managers could be a resource-based strategy. If in the course of managerial interplay
resources are assessed, the competitive capabilities of rivals and the features of the
competitive landscape are discussed, and the companies’ own capabilities and limitations are
identified, the result will be what Peteraf (forthcoming 2004) calls a resource-based strategy.
Additionally, if strategy-making were developed with participation, the process were
effective and the outcome were precisely such a resource-based strategy, then participation
would have been used effectively. 
Effectiveness of participation, as described in this paper, has been linked to the
achievement of legitimation between top and middle managers. While quantity and quality of
information exchange, collaborative behavior, and joint decision-making are elements of
behavioral integration (Hambrick, 1994, 1998), we argue that to some extent these elements
are present in legitimation. Joint decision-making between top and middle managers is
transformed to mutual interaction, top management being the judge. In contrast, collaborative
behavior and information exchange remain valid for legitimation to exist. All the same, we
19must add that information shared will have to be mainly objective, rather than mere opinion,
for legitimacy to develop. In general, we can say that legitimation precedes integration and
may be a necessary condition for the latter. 
Conclusion
This paper has shown one possible way to combine Hart’s modes to take advantage
of participation. In doing so we have aimed at advancing theory regarding the interplay
between top and middle managers. This interplay substantiates the strategy-making process
inasmuch as participation by organizational members in general, and middle managers in
particular, exists. Our aim in this paper has been to untangle how participation can shape the
strategy process to make it more effective. Our target was to analyze how top management’s
interplay with organizational members would lead to cooperative behavior, in much the same
way as behavioral integration is a desirable quality of top management groups (Hambrick,
1998).
We  have proposed that participation can be a useful characteristic of the strategy-
making process under the conditions that emerged from our multiple case study and in light
of Hart’s modes of strategy-making. Additionally, we have further described the concept of
legitimation as the mechanism that resolves middle and top management interplay in such a
way that goals and means are mutually accepted. These two concepts depart from the
standard process model in that they offer a more integrative view of how strategy-making
develops. 
We  have built on concepts of issue-selling (Dutton et al., 1997) and middle
management involvement in the strategy process (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000) to create a
model that combines these bottom –up forces with top down forces–. Thus, we have
described how top and middle managers may interact to generate strategy-making so that
subsequent action linked to strategy is reached. All in all, the present study is an attempt to
overcome the either top-down or bottom-up view of the strategy process and put together a
more accurate view that may eventually be useful for management practice. 
20References
Ansoff, IH. 1987. The emerging paradigm of strategic behavior, Strategic Management
Journal 8: 501-515.
Argyris, C, Putman, R, McLain-Smith, D. 1985. Action science: Concepts, methods and skills
for research and intervention. Jossey-Bass Pub.: San Francisco.
Balogun, J, Huff, A, Johnson, P. 2003. Three responses to the methodological challenge of
studying strategizing, Journal of Management Studies 40: 197-224.
Bourgeois, LJ. 1980. Performance and consensus, Strategic Management Journal 1: 227-248.
Bourgeois, LJ. 1985. Strategic goals, perceived uncertainty and economic performance,
Academy of Management Journal 28: 548-573.
Bower, JL. 1970. Managing the resource allocation process: A study of corporate planning
and investment. Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Harvard University: Boston, MA.
Boyd, BK, Salamin, A. 2001. Strategic reward systems: A contingency model of pay system
design, Strategic Management Journal 22: 777-792.
Brown, SL, Eisenhardt, KM. 1995. Product development: Past research, present findings, and
future directions, Academy of Management Review 20: 343-378.
Burgelman, RA. 1983a. A model of the interaction of strategic behavior, corporate context
and the concept of strategy, Academy of Management Review 8: 61-70.
Burgelman, RA. 1983b. Corporate entrepreneurship and strategic management: Insights from
a process study, Management Science 29: 1349-1365.
Burgelman, RA. 2002. Strategy as vector and the inertia of coevolutionary lock-in,
Administrative Science Quarterly 47: 325-358.
Canales, JI, Vilà, J. (Forthcoming in 2004). Strategy formation effects on managerial action:
Strategy in the back of your mind. In S. Floyd, J. Roos, F. Kellermanns and C. Jacobs
(Eds.), Innovating Strategy Process. Blackwell, Part of the SMS series (Ed. M. Hitt).
Crossan, MM, Berdrow, I. 2003. Organizational learning and strategic renewal, Strategic
Management Journal 24: 1087-1105.
Delmar, F, Shane, S. 2003. Does business planning facilitate the development of new
ventures?, Strategic Management Journal 24: 1165-1185.
Dess, GG. 1987. Consensus on strategy formulation and organizational performance:
Competitors in a fragmented industry, Strategic Management Journal 8: 259-277.
Dutton, JE, Ashford, SJ. 1993. Selling issues to top management, Academy of Management
Review 18: 397-428.
Dutton, JE, Ashford, SJ, O’Neill, RM, Lawrence, KA. 2001. Moves that matter: Issue selling
and organizational change, Academy of Management Journal 44: 716-736.
Dutton, JE, Ashford, SJ, O’Neill, RM, Hayes, E, Wierba, EE. 1997. Reading the wind: How
middle managers access the context for selling issues to top management, Strategic
Management Journal 18: 407-425.
Floyd, SW, Wooldridge, B. 1992. Middle management involvement in strategy and its
association with strategic type: A research note, Strategic Management Journal 13:
153-167.
Floyd, SW, Wooldridge, B. 2000. Building strategy from the middle: Reconceptualizing
strategy process (foundations for organizational science). Sage Publications: London.
Grant, RM. 2003. Strategic planning in a turbulent environment: Evidence from the oil
majors, Strategic Management Journal 24: 491-517.
Hambrick, DC. 1994. Top management groups: A conceptual integration and reconsideration
of the team label. In LL Cummings (ed.), Research in organizational behavior, 16:
171-214. JAI Press: Greenwich, CT.
Hambrick, DC. 1998. Corporate coherence and top management teams. In M Tushman (ed.),
Navigating change: How CEOs, top teams and boards steer transformation: 123-140.
Harvard University Press: Boston, MA.
21Hart, SL. 1992. An integrative framework for strategy-making process, Academy of
Management Review 17: 327-351.
Hart, SL, Banbury, C. 1994. How strategy-making process can make a difference, Strategic
Management Journal 15: 251-269.
Hofer, CW, Schendel, DE. 1978. Strategy formulation: Analytical concepts. West Publishing:
St Paul, MN.
Huy, QN. 2002. Emotional balancing of organizational continuity and radical change: The
contribution of middle managers, Administrative Science Quarterly 47: 31-69.
Krueger, R. 1999. Analysing and reporting focus group results. Sage: London.
Lovas, B, Ghoshal, S. 2000. Strategy as guided evolution, Strategic Management Journal 21:
875-896.
Marginson, DE. 2002. Management control systems and their effect on strategy formation at
middle-management levels: Evidence from a UK organization, Strategic Management
Journal 23: 1019-1031.
Maritan, CA. 2001. Capital investment as investing in organizational capabilities: An
empirically grounded process model, Academy of Management Journal 44: 513-532.
McGregor. 1960. The human side of the enterprise. McGraw-Hill: New York.
Miles, MB, Huberman, AM. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook
(second ed.). Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA.
Peteraf, M. (Forthcoming 2004). Taking a resource-based view of the Bower-Burgelman
modes (and vice versa). In JL Bower and CG Gilbert (eds), Strategy as Resource
Allocation.
Pinto, JK, Prescott, JE. 1990. Planning and tactical factors in the project implementation
process, Journal of Management Studies 27: 305-327.
Samra-Fredericks, D. 2003. Strategizing as lived experience and strategists’ everyday efforts
to shape strategic direction, Journal of Management Studies 40: 141-174.
Seidman, I. 1998. Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in
educational and social science (second ed.). Teachers College Press: New York.
Silverman, D. 2001. Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text and
interaction (second ed.). Sage: London.
Wooldridge, B, Floyd, SW. 1990. The strategy process, middle management involvement,
and organizational performance, Strategic Management Journal 11: 231-241.
Yin, RK. 1994. Case study research: Design and methods (second ed.). Sage: London.
22Exhibit 1
Interview protocol for study in chapter 4
• Frequency in carrying out a strategic exercise? 
• What are the outputs obtained? 
• What improvements has the process undergone and how has it evolved?
• What are the main difficulties encountered? 
• How is strategy revised, when necessary? 
• How satisfied are they with the present process with respect to:
– Internal agreement? 
–T eam coordination?
– Integration of teams?
– Autonomy of subordinates?
– Delegation capacity?
–E f ficacy in managerial action?
Exhibit 2
List of interviews
Company Name Interviewee’s position Round
1 Inssubanc Human Resources Director 1st
2 Inssubanc Human Resources Director 1st
3 Inssubanc Commercial Director 2nd
4 Engcosult General Director Barcelona 1st
5 Engcosult Innovation director 1st
6 Engcosult General Director Barcelona 2nd
7 Engcosult Project Director Barcelona 2nd
8 Engcosult Project Director Barcelona 1st
9 Mobility Planning Director 1st
10 Mobility CEO 1st
11 Mobility Planning Director 1st
12 Mobility Planning Director 2nd
13 Refoil Human Resources Director 1st
14 Refoil Staff External Relations 2nd
15 Techno Business Planning director 1st
16 Techno Business Planning director 1st
17 Techno Business Planning director 2nd
18 Techno Planning staff  2nd
19 Prosteel General Director 1st
20 Prosteel Human Resources Director 2nd
23Exhibit 3
Number of participants in the interactive discussion group









Issues for discussion in the interactive discussion group session
1. To what extent is FORMALIZATION desirable in the way you use the strategy process? 
– In which parts of the process is it most effective in your company? 
–W ould you cascade objectives or use direct communication, in your case? 
– How do you achieve flexibility and adaptability if line managers are apart from the
corporate office, in your case?
2. How is PARTICIPATION by different managers in the strategy process achieved in your
company?
– In which parts of the process is the participation of lower level managers required in
your company? 
– Is it possible to involve everybody in developing strategy in your company? How do
you achieve brain-share of managers for the planning exercise in your company? 
– In strategic reflection, where would you use broad participation versus a reduced
group? 
3. How do you make the PROCESS (of formulation and implementation) valuable and
perceived as such? 
– How do you gain managerial “Passion-Share” in the implementation period in your
company? 
– Where do you encounter most hurdles to the smooth development of the strategy
process in your company?
4. Which parts of the process would you design to be strictly BOTTOM-UP and which,
strictly TOP- DOWN? 
– How do you go from the more general to the more detailed? 
– How do you conduct good ideas from the base of the organization so that they reach
the summit? 
– How do you balance centralization and decentralization?
5. How do you ensure that STRATEGY is widely SHARED? 
–W ould you look for consensus or mere agreement, or what other forms in your case? 
– How can you be sure that executives know and agree with the strategy? 
– Is it necessary to reach consensus on strategy in your company? 
– How do you get people to be committed?
6. How do you make the LONG AND SHORT-TERM STRATEGY compatible? 
– How do you make day-to-day demands compatible with broad objectives? 
– How do you establish priorities for allocating resources among different projects?
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